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Abstract
Human aesthetic practices show a sensitivity to the ways that the appearance of an 
artefact manifests skills and other qualities of the maker. We investigate a possi-
ble origin for this kind of sensibility, locating it in the need for co-ordination of 
skill-transmission in the Acheulean stone tool culture. We argue that our narrative 
supports the idea that Acheulean agents were aesthetic agents. In line with this we 
ofer what may seem an absurd comparison: between the Acheulean and the Quat-
trocento. In making it we display some hidden complexity in human aesthetic 
responses to an artefact. We conclude with a brief review of rival explanations—
biological and/or cultural—of how this skills-based sensibility became a regular fea-
ture of human aesthetic practices.
Keywords Acheulian · Handaxe · Aesthetics · Cultural learning · Hominin cognition
The aim of painting: to give pleasure, good will and fame to the painter, more than 
riches.
Alberti, On Painting (Alberti 1435/1970).
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1  Aesthetics and the act of making
While aesthetics occupies a respectable though modest corner of philosophy, 
the scholars best placed to apply its results to the human world—anthropologists, 
archaeologists and art historians—are generally indiferent or hostile to its ideas.1 
There’s a notion abroad that aesthetics celebrates the resources of uncontaminated 
perceptual experience, isolated from meaning, use, status or anything else of signii-
cance.2 Yet within contemporary aesthetics this same view is widely rejected exactly 
because it is unable to do justice to the richness and complexity of aesthetic judge-
ment.3 Take for example our sensitivity to the ways an artefact’s appearance is a 
trace of the activity of its makers. A Vermeer and a perfectly executed copy may 
have exactly the same appearance in the sense that one could not identify the copy 
simply by comparing their surfaces. But they are not the same aesthetically; we are 
sensitive to the fact that the appearance of the one is a trace of forms of activity not 
exempliied in the production of the other. Vermeer made compositional choices not 
open to the copyist, exhibiting talents not disclosed by the copyist’s product.4 There 
may be occasions on which, or people for whom, the manifestation of copying skills 
are more important than creativity in composition. The point still holds: what we 
value aesthetically we value at least in part for its manifestation of qualities in the 
maker.5
Does that mean that the Vermeer and the copy do not, after all, look the same, 
at least when we understand their background diferences? Answering that ques-
tion depends on how widely you draw the boundaries of what can literally be seen.6 
We don’t need to take a stand on that issue. You may think that what is appreci-
ated aesthetically is available in perception alone—the perception-only view; in that 
case you should say that what is visually represented goes beyond the “low level” 
properties of shape, colour, size and movement. You may not like that, because 
you think that vision, strictly conceived, encompasses only the low level proper-
ties—the narrow conception of what can be seen; in that case you should say that 
1 But see below, text to note 16.
2 For an example of the aesthetic narrowly understood see Coleman (2004): “… with highly symbolic 
works, an inability to comprehend meaning does not appear to impede our aesthetic sense at all”. For 
criticism of views of this kind see Currie (2012); for a convergent assessment see Rose (2017).
3 See Walton (1970) for a classic statement of this rejection.
4 There are aspects of our comparative valuing of these pictures—particularly inancial valuing—which 
relect factors other than their values as traces. But trace-value is one important factor.
5 This relation to the perception of skill is widely recognised in the aesthetics literature. Frank Sibley 
noted that “as we come to realize how boldly or subtly, with what skill, economy, and exactness, the 
efect is achieved, how each detail is judged to a nicety and all work together with a ine precision, our 
appreciation is deepened and enriched” (Sibley 2001, p. 37; from a paper irst published in 1965). Ken-
dall Walton says “…the reader may also appreciate, he may admire with pleasure, the poet’s perceptive-
ness and insightfulness and her skill in presenting profound truths in a vivid and convincing manner. 
Then the reader’s enjoyment is (in part at least) aesthetic” (Walton 1993, p. 55); Stephen Davies says 
“recognition of the beauty distinctive to a representation might be inseparable from an appreciation of 
the techniques of depiction” (Davies 2006, pp. 235–236). Dutton (1979) is a systematic and inluential 
statement of this sort of view.
6 Helton (2016) is a review of this fast-moving ield.
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aesthetic sensibility is not conined to the purely perceptual.7 Neither view is intrin-
sically improbable. Whether perception should be characterised narrowly or widely 
we leave undecided. All we insist on is a rejection of the narrow conception of the 
aesthetic, according to which the bounds of the aesthetic are the bounds of percep-
tion narrowly conceived.
Our positive account starts from the idea that artefacts display, through their aes-
thetic properties, the skills, sensibilities and sometimes personality traits that con-
tributed to the fashioning of those very properties. Our intensely social evolution has 
made us exquisitely sensitive to properties of these kinds, and their manifestation in 
artefacts creates and sustains powerful afective and cognitive relations (including 
the good will noted by Alberti) between observers and makers. These relations are 
in turn highly explanatory of the ways people value art works and other aesthetically 
charged things.8
The claim is not a merely conjunctive one: not just that we delight in the aesthet-
ics of appearances and value the skill that went into fashioning those appearances. 
Rather, how an artefact is seen as aesthetically delightful and/or valuable is afected 
by the skills and other qualities it manifests. We label this idea aesthetics as the 
manifestation of personal qualities, or Manifestation, or sometimes simply M.
M is not meant as a piece of conceptual analysis. Perhaps we sometimes take 
a narrowly perceptual, uncontextualized pleasure in an object’s appearance; there 
might be creatures for whom this is all the pleasure perceptual experience provides. 
We are happy for such pleasures to count as aesthetic and are less interested in what 
is essential to the aesthetic than what is important for it. Edward Craig points out 
that something can be deeply illuminating of a practice, without being a necessary 
or suicient condition for its occurrence.9 While M may not be a universal of aes-
thetic experience it is exempliied well beyond the Western art canon. Hand-made 
artefacts of all kinds may be visually indistinguishable from machine-made ones, 
but rarely have the same aesthetic appeal. And work in empirical psychology sup-
ports the idea that artefacts generally are understood to have an interest and value 
that depends as much on the performance of the maker as on the appearance or func-
tionality of the product.10 In many languages aesthetic predicates often apply to both 
the activity and the result; as a commentator on Yorùbá carving and its terminol-
ogy says “dídán denotes not only the beautiful “luminosity” of surface but also the 
sculptor’s painstaking inal procedure of “polishing” the object. The resulting object 
is the palpable index of the care that went into its manufacture”.11 We might also 
7 See e.g. Nehamas (2007), especially p. 94.
8 See Currie (2019). People can exercise tremendous skills and creative abilities to ends we think are not 
aesthetically worthwhile. If we do think that, it is likely that we take the work to manifest some failure of 
sensibility.
9 Craig (1991).
10 See Newman and Bloom (2011) and Cho and Schwarz (2008).
11 Doris (2005, p. 30).
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look to the Italian Renaissance: for Vasari, grace in a picture is the manifestation of 
the artist’s graceful performance.12
These isolated examples prove little of course. We need detailed historical and 
cross-cultural studies to gauge the proper signiicance of M. As a contribution to 
that project we examine a practice of the distant past: Acheulean tool manufac-
ture. We make a suggestion about what brought our distant ancestors to the point 
where they began, systematically and self-consciously, to experience artefacts in 
ways that exemplify M. Accordingly, Sect.  2 turns away from philosophy to that 
deep evolutionary past, and to why ancient stone tools are such rich sources of 
knowledge about the cognitive and social lives of our distant ancestors. Section 3 
outlines how M was exempliied in Early Stone Age culture. Section 4 gathers evi-
dence from diverse sources to support that claim, while keeping in view the lim-
its on our explanatory capacities; however upbeat we may be about the evidential 
value of stone tools, however optimistic we are about the prospects for the histori-
cal sciences, there’s no disguising these speculations as established fact.13 Sec-
tion  5 returns us to more philosophical territory, arguing that our narrative sup-
ports the idea that Acheulean agents were aesthetic agents; it even attempts what 
will seem an absurd comparison, between the Acheulean and the Quattrocento. In 
making it we hope to display some hidden richness in what counts as an aesthetic 
response to an artefact. Section 6 speculates briely and inconclusively on how the 
forces of biology and culture may have helped make M a regular feature of human 
experience.
2  The role of Acheulean tools in cognitive archaeology
The oldest artefacts likely to excite our aesthetic interest are the Acheulean handaxes 
and other stone tools, sometimes of remarkable workmanship, elegance and sym-
metry (Figs. 1, 2). Some go back to 1.75 million years ago (mya), though the more 
obviously interesting ones are said to be mostly in the period from about 0.7 mya—
the Late Acheulean.14 Of this industry Wynn and Gowlett say:
…the shape of an Acheulean handaxe was often “over-determined”: that is, 
the maker gave more attention and efort to producing the shape than was nec-
14 According to some commentators, the early Acheulean shows, in some places, a pattern of increased 
reinement of making through time: “Comparing the Konso handaxe assemblages of ᙺ 1.75, ᙺ 1.6, 
and ᙺ 1.25 Ma, a clear increase of workmanship can be seen in edge modiication and tip thinning” (Bey-
ene et al. 2013, p. 1589).
12 Vasari (1568/1980). Vasari’s constant theme is what the work tells of its making: works are made 
diligently, gracefully, the maker endowing the stone “with the attributes of living lesh”, some works 
showing “much grace, … made with beautiful proportion” or having “excellence of invention, grace and 
manner”, others “so grossly made, and in such a rough style, that it is impossible to imagine worse”. For 
commentary see Blunt (1962), especially pp. 95–100.
13 For optimism about the historical sciences see Currie (2017).
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essary for basic… functionality, similar to the ornamental lourishes modern 
armorers add to ceremonial swords.15
It is these “ornamental lourishes” that will concern us. Over-determination in the 
Acheulean industry has long been noted and the idea of an aesthetic component to 
it is now gaining some traction in archaeological circles.16 Often this is dealt with 
under such headings as “perceptual bias”, “peak shift”, or “perceptual ambiguity”, 
the assumption being that what aesthetics adds to the explanatory mix is the idea 
that functional artefacts may be reshaped by arbitrary preferences for certain percep-
tual forms.17 In line with Sect. 1 above, we say this is too thin an account of the aes-
thetic. Aesthetic elaboration has an important social function, the operation of which 
is no more separable from the attractions of an object’s form than the aesthetic efect 
of a Renaissance painting is separable from one’s awareness of the maker’s skills 
and sensibilities manifested in it.
Because of their robust material constitution, we know a good deal about the 
making of these ancient objects. Their surfaces provide a literal blow by blow 
account of how they were constructed; the removal of inal lakes leaves a scar 
on the remainder, and earlier stages in the reduction process can often be recon-
structed by piecing together the on-site debitage. Flakes were removed in order then 
to remove further lakes and analysis suggest that makers followed a tree structure 
of actions: for the more complex and reined items a hierarchy of ten nested levels 
has been proposed.18 We are even able to reproduce the process of making through 
the work of modern “expert knappers” whose brain activities have been carefully 
recorded. Acheulean tools are an extraordinarily valuable window into aspects of the 
mental and physical capacities of people of several ancestor species: probably Homo 
ergaster and Homo heidelbergensis; possibly Homo habilis.
When it comes to cognitive archaeology, hand axes are the artefacts that keep on 
giving. They suggest a great deal about the social organisation of the agents who made 
them; as we shall see, this sheds important light on the question why these objects are 
sometimes over-determined, as Wynn and Gowlett put it. Peter Hiscock has reviewed 
the evidence for a sophisticated sensitivity to the economics of tool making even in 
the Oldowan technology which preceded the Acheulean: particular materials were pre-
ferred to lower quality but closer supplies, and were transported over signiicant dis-
tances.19 The record of caching of raw materials at this early period indicates a detailed 
knowledge, socially transmitted, of the material properties of lithic resources and their 
locations across a wide area, as well as of the related location of food sources and 
15 Wynn and Gowlett (2018). On the relation between shape and functionality in handaxes see Key and 
Lycett (2017); see also Machin et al. (2007).
16 See the excellently illustrated volume First Sculpture, edited by Berlant and Wynn (2018), with com-
mentaries by Gowlett, Wynn and others.
17 See commentary by Berlant and Wynn (p. 26, 51, 73, 92, 118) and by V. S. Ramachandran (p. 69) in 
First Sculpture. Certainly, perceptual biases have their part to play in explaining the speciic forms that 
human aesthetic experience takes; see Currie (2011).
18 Stout (2011).
19 Hiscock (2014).
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predators. Caching practices further indicate forward planning and a high degree of 
cooperation, with materials transported and stored ahead of use. What, then, does the 
process of tool manufacture suggests concerning interpersonal relations within lithic 
cultures?
Fig. 1  Handaxe from Olduvai 
Gorge Bed II, Tanzania, about 
1.4 million years old. By kind 
permission of Professor Thomas 
Wynn
Fig. 2  Handaxe from Kathu 
Pan, South Africa, about 
500,000 years old. A very 
exceptional piece. By kind 
permission of Professor Thomas 
Wynn
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3  Learning the trade
Stone reduction in a systematic way is a complex process that requires both planning 
and lexible and skilful responses to a range of ways the materials can respond.20 
The process is also inherently dangerous, given lying debris and an absence of 
medical treatment; these dangers reduce signiicantly with increased skill in making. 
Because each blow comes with the risk of both ruinous fracturing of material and 
injury to the maker there is pressure to make the reduction process as economical 
as possible, which in turn requires a plan—a “lithic narrative” as Hiscock puts it—
tailored to the needs of each individual piece. The return to increments of skill in 
lithic industries is signiicant, and the skills involved are complex enough to demand 
instruction within something that has come to be called an “apprentice system”.
The idea of lithic apprenticeships is not merely that novices copied the behaviours 
of skilled knappers. Observation of the action of a fast-working knapper provides lit-
tle useful instruction; one needs to understand how speciic actions are responses 
both to the overall plan for the piece (the lithic narrative) and to the moment-by-
moment problems thrown up by idiosyncrasies of the material and unpredicted out-
comes of blows. The claim is that gaining the relevant skills in a practical time and 
without high risk of injury required instruction.21 Hiscock suggests that that this 
was given with the aid of “gestural language”.22 On independent grounds, Wynn 
and colleagues argue that Acheulean makers possessed a kind of expertise which, 
in modern populations, requires possession of organised semantic categories. They 
conclude that “knappers had declarative/semantic labels for these concepts, either 
in the form of vocal words or perhaps gestures (we favour the former)”.23 There is 
therefore some convergence towards the idea of Acheulean agents possessing at least 
quasi-linguistic resources to support the learning process.
The picture emerging is this. Lithic culture, through and perhaps even before the 
Acheulean, displays signs of complex planning, co-operation and cultural learn-
ing: assisted learning that uses cognitive processes, such as imitation and teaching, 
which enhance the idelity of information transfer.24 Given the importance of the 
skills involved, the beneits of possessing them, and the cost to teachers in time and 
efort of providing them, learning opportunities may not have been freely availa-
ble. Learners gravitated to those with evident skills, who could then expect to gain 
through returns of provisioning, co-operation and deference. Teachers competed 
by signalling their own (highest) levels of skill through public acts of tool produc-
tion. The advantages of displaying stand-out levels of skills led to the production 
of artefacts which signiicantly exceeded the requirements of ordinary use. To help 
draw attention to the enhanced workmanship, these items were often made salient in 
20 See Stout and Khreisheh (2015) and Stout et al. (2015).
21 Morgan et al. (2015).
22 Hiscock ibid, p. 35. See also Sterelny (2012a). But a case against the development of complex gestural 
language is made in Irvine (2016).
23 See Herzlinger et al. (2017).
24 See Heyes (2018, p. 86).
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various ways: they might employ less common, hard to work and perceptually pleas-
ing materials, display high levels of symmetry, as well sometimes as artful viola-
tions of symmetry, careful retention of a fossil or other embedded object, be of large 
(or notably small) size and with inely worked tips.25 Given that these were exercises 
in advertisement rather than practical projects, it did not matter that their display-
function sometimes compromised or even negated their usefulness.
To the extent that acquiring these skills conferred advantages on learners, the 
capacity to discriminate highly skilled teachers was itself an advantage, sharpen-
ing the competition by making learners better informed about, and more rationally 
responsive to, the quality of the signal. As skill levels increased among makers, the 
power to detect the ways in which genuinely skilful making is manifested increased 
also. In such an environment a capacity to respond to—and especially to produce—
artefacts which manifest in striking ways the qualities that went into their making 
would be very useful. In this we see early—perhaps the earliest—signs in our line-
age of an aesthetic sensibility of the kind that concerns us here. Section 6 returns to 
this claim. But so far we have only a story. What does the evidence say?
4  Learning and teaching in the Acheulean: theory and evidence
One likely objection to the story is that it depends on an exaggerated picture of the 
role of teaching in Early Stone Age communities. After all, current evidence from 
hunter-gatherer societies indicates that episodes of teaching are rare. So it is said.
Before we look at the available evidence it must be said that the potential for evi-
dence of current teaching to support the proposal is limited; modern hunter gatherer 
societies are populated by modern humans and Acheulean societies were not, and 
there are many ways the two populations are cognitively and behaviourally distinct. 
On the same ground, a demonstrable or probable absence of teaching in modern 
hunter-gatherer societies would tell signiicantly against the proposal: if we don’t 
ind teaching in modern hunter-gatherer societies, what chance is there that such 
a cognitively demanding activity was found in communities which, despite some 
likely structural similarities, were populated by cognitively much more limited 
agents with correspondingly limited means of communication? In the light of this 
the best one can hope for is weak evidence for the proposal, and the avoidance of 
strong evidence against it. And that is what we have.
25 Some authorities have suggested that there is a bias towards reporting symmetrical hand axes; James 
Cole (2015, p. 713) says, on the basis of an examination of 2680 bifaces from seven sites, “symmetri-
cal bifaces do not appear to have a particularly strong presence in any assemblage and do not appear 
to increase as time progress” But White and Foulds (2018), while inding a degree of reporting bias, 
conclude that at Middle Palaeolithic sites in Britain, “the majority of handaxes are highly symmetrical 
or better” (p. 308). Unlike Cole, they use automated measures of symmetry rather than observer judge-
ments. The latter method seems precarious because our intuitive standards of symmetry, derived from 
constant experience with machine-made items, might be quite diferent from those prevailing in the 
Acheulean.
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Weak, perhaps very weak, evidence would be a bad outcome from our point 
of view would it not? Not so bad in the circumstances. If teaching among modern 
hunter-gatherers was the only reason we had for believing in teaching in the Acheu-
lean, the hypothesis would not be very credible. But we do have another reason for 
believing this: the intrinsic diiculty of acquiring the complex lithic skills described 
above without teaching. In developing their theoretical model of the evolution of 
teaching Fogarty et al. say that “cumulative cultural evolution allows complex, high 
itness traits that no individual could acquire on his or her own or through inad-
vertent social learning, ranging from ancestral lithic technology, tools and weaponry 
through to contemporary technology, to be present and available to teach in human 
populations.”26 Tehrani and Riede say that “Even armed with a highly sophisticated 
set of imitative abilities, it is diicult to imagine how a novice could… achieve the 
delicately calibrated balance between precision and power exercised by a master 
stone knapper, just by repeated observation.” They add that “it seems highly proba-
ble that teaching has been an important mechanism of material culture transmission 
since at least the Lower Palaeolithic, when the irst complex lithic forms emerged.”27
For all this, it would be of concern if it turned out that in the only societies we 
can now meaningfully compare with the Acheulean there is no evidence of teaching. 
In disputing this latter claim, as we shall, our hope is not that evidence of teaching 
in modern hunter-gatherer societies will raise the probability of the hypothesis very 
high, but rather that, by protecting it from a substantially undermining counter-argu-
ment, it will prevent it from falling very low.
Our story’s potential for conirmation is limited in two other ways. First of all, 
much of the current evidence of teaching in hunter-gatherer societies concerns pro-
cesses of child-learning. Despite denials from some investigators, there is evidence 
of child-teaching in hunter-gatherer societies, once we abandon the idea that this 
requires an institutionalised setting.28 However, evidence of this kind is problematic 
from our point of view for two reasons: (i) it is unlikely that very young people in 
the Acheulean would have been taught the skills of lithic tool manufacture, given the 
strength and dexterity required, and (ii) inferences concerning children from modern 
hunter-gatherer societies to those of the Acheulean are particularly precarious on the 
assumption that the length of childhood has increased dramatically between these 
times. For our purposes, better evidence would be of teaching in adolescence and 
early adulthood, especially given that, on the present hypothesis, learners played an 
active part in choosing teachers.
28 Evidence reviewed by Csibra and Gergely (2011) comes from the Aka in West Africa, where 
“[p]eople reported that they had learnt most (80%) of their skills from their parents, often by teaching” 
[citing Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986)] and the Kpelle in Liberia: “knowledgeable adults teach their 
children about medicines (p. 68) and board games (p. 116), give advice about making traps (p. 146), 
guide children’s hands when learning how to weave a bag (pp. 151–152) and demonstrate how to make a 
hammock (p. 154)” [citing Lancy (1996)].
26 Fogarty et al. (2011, p. 2767).
27 Tehrani and Riede (2008, p. 318). Indeed there is evidence of copying errors in the archaeological 
record, adding support to the idea that the reproduction of tool-making techniques was intrinsically dif-
icult; see Lycett et al. (2016) and Shipton et al. (2019).
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Secondly, a good deal of evidence of teaching beyond childhood is related to the 
inculcation of what are called “Cultural Values and Kinship” and “Religious Beliefs 
and Practices”.29 Evidence of teaching of this kind, which often involves story-
telling, would not be good evidence of the kind of close, practice-based teaching 
required for passing on lithic skills.30 While some things relevant to lithic manu-
facture such as resource location might be conveyed in narrative form, lithic skills 
are, as emphasised above, highly dependent on competence with the idiosyncrasy 
of materials.31 Nor can we assume that Acheulean agents had a language that would 
bear the weight of story-telling.
Our focus is on skills-based teaching of maturing and mature agents in hunter-
gatherer societies. Particularly relevant is the inculcation of hunting skills which 
are complex, and not taught until adolescence. For this there certainly is evidence. 
Dira and Hewlett studied hunting among the Chabu people and found that verbal 
instruction was the most common form for teaching these skills; also, Chabu adoles-
cents were able to choose between teachers.32 More generally, Boyette and Hewlett 
report that direct instruction is used most often in the domains of complex ecologi-
cal knowledge or subsistence skills, of which stone tool making is one.33 On a more 
personal note Bonnie Hewlett recounts her experience of learning basket weaving 
from women of the Aka people. It involved demonstration, instruction and correc-
tion over 3 weeks for many hours at a time and apparently did not seem odd or dif-
icult to those supplying it.34
The best evidence for our story would be from the modern transmission of lithic 
skills. There are few contemporary communities where stone tool manufacture con-
tinues but detailed ethnographic evidence from a village in what is now Papua Prov-
ince documents an apprenticeship system that can last 10 years aimed at producing 
the long and slender ads heads used in this agricultural (rather than hunter-gatherer) 
community. Traditionally, apprenticeship here began around the age of 12–13. With 
the availability of industrially made tools demand has declined and interest in the 
skill seems now to be connected with the perceived value of tradition; apprentices 
are more often in their twenties.35
29 See Garield et al. (2016).
30 Cultural and religious teaching often takes the form of story-narration; see Scalise Sugiyama (2017).
31 See Stout et  al. (2002): “Individuals interviewed indicated that inding high-quality material is one 
of the most diicult and important aspects of adze production” (p. 696); “Craftsmen who happen to be 
in the immediate area gather to discuss the merits of the selected boulder, commenting on the size and 
uniformity of the grain, the danger of internal laws (ismar), and the presence of black (bataya) or white 
(boladiatenga, “deepskin belt”) mineral bands…. Although they realize that these bands often represent 
points of weakness in the rock, the adze makers prize them for their aesthetic value” (p. 697).
32 Dira and Hewlett (2016).
33 Boyette and Hewlett (2017).
34 Hewlett (2013).
35 “It is quite common, for example, for one man to make suggestions to another about where to attempt 
the next lake removal or to comment on the quality of the material being worked. Similarly, a worker 
who is experiencing diiculties may ask another to try his hand at the task. Such interaction occurs 
between peers but is most frequent between experts and apprentices” (Stout et al. 2002, p. 703).
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The vast temporal distance between the Acheulean and now makes retrodiction 
hazardous. But there is, inally, some evidence of teaching in at least the Upper Pal-
aeolithic. Using analysis of the operator chain at Magdalenian sites, Pigeot claims to 
have reconstructed evidence for an apprenticeship system.36 Similar inferences have 
been made concerning late Palaeolithic sites such as Trollesgave, eastern Denmark 
where Fischer argues for a ‘school of lintknapping’.37 Kim Sterelny cites a study 
by Linda Grimm according to which “some cores show evidence of being largely 
made by inexpert knappers, but from blanks provided by experts, and with occa-
sional expert intervention”.38
After this presentation of theory and evidence we turn to an interpretive question 
that needs a good deal of philosophical structuring: to what extent is the Acheulean 
an aesthetic culture?
5  Aesthetic sensibility
Does the story so far support the attribution of aesthetic sensitivity to Acheulean 
agents? Aesthetic sensitivity comes in degrees and we should avoid a very demand-
ing conception of what such sensitivity amounts to, or one keyed to the idiosyncra-
sies of art in the twenty-irst century. We should not require Acheulean agents to 
have a concept of the aesthetic, just as we don’t need to attribute a concept of sex to 
agents who show an interest in sexual partners.39 We should not require that Acheu-
lean agents have some uniquely “aesthetic” experience: attempts to specify such a 
thing for humans has been one of the failures of modern aesthetics. We can assume 
instead that aesthetic experience was as heterogeneous for them as it seems to be for 
us. We should also not require that Acheulean agents engaged in conscious reason-
ing about the aesthetic qualities of their artefacts; few of us do that. All we need say 
is that these agents were apt to take pleasure in the sensory qualities these objects 
presented (primarily visual but possibly tactile as well), where that pleasure is mod-
ulated by awareness of the ways those sensory qualities manifest the skills exercised 
in their production. Again, this modulation need not function by way of reasoning; 
we need only attribute to these agents a primitive capacity to “see” skilful making in 
these objects just as we “see” personal qualities, from simple fearfulness to resolute-
ness, in the demeanours and actions of our fellows. Our scare quotes recall what we 
previously granted: that neither of these cases need be literally a matter of seeing; 
the narrow theory of perceptual content may be true. But if we do not literally see 
fearfulness or dignity we often do not reason our way to them; we ind ourselves 
recognising the agent as fearful in a way that makes talk of seeing these things very 
natural. We sometimes recognise, in the same visually guided and mandatory way, 
36 Pigeot (1990).
37 Fischer (1989). Evidence from Upper Palaeolithic sites is summarised in Tehrani and Riede (2008).
38 Sterelny (2012b, p. 42), citing Grimm (2000).
39 Lopes (2007) argues that there are artistic communities with no concept of art; not that we are arguing 
that the Acheulean was an artistic community—see this section further on.
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the skilfulness manifested in an artefact, though it may take experience and back-
ground knowledge to get us to that point. A pleasure taken in form-as-indicative-of-
skilful-making is all we require to support the very modest levels of aesthetic sensi-
bility we are attributing to Acheulean subjects. Later in this section we will suggest 
an enrichment to this minimalist account of the aesthetic: one which is certainly 
present in historical times and may have been present in the Acheulean.
An objection to the minimal aesthetic is that Acheulean agents regarded the 
appearances of lithic artefacts instrumentally, that is, as useful indicators of skills, 
whereas aesthetically sensitive agents derive satisfaction from the appearances of 
things “for themselves”, as we say. But what is enjoyed “for itself” may also have 
substantial instrumental value, where that instrumental value is a precondition of 
any attribution of “inal” value. Christine Korsgaard says
A mink coat can be valued the way we value things for their own sakes: a 
person might put it on a list of the things he always wanted, or aspire to have 
some day, right alongside adventure, travel, or peace of mind. Yet it is also odd 
to say it is valued simply for its own sake. A coat is essentially instrumental: 
were it not for the ways in which human beings respond to cold, we would 
not care about them or ever think about them…. Mink coats… are things that 
human beings might choose partly for their own sakes under the condition of 
their instrumentality: that is, given the role such things play in our lives.40
In the same way we may concede that hand axes are essentially instrumental and 
that their signiicance for Acheulean agents depends on the nexus of transactions 
they facilitate, be they episodes of meat-extraction or of skill-signalling. Yet, under 
these “conditions of instrumentality” they, or their appearances, may be admired 
“for their own sakes”.
In the same place Korsgaard makes a related and important point, though one 
which subsequent commentators have sought to amend.41 For our purposes we need 
say only the following. We may think of something as having value merely as an 
instrument that helps us achieve something else which is (let’s suppose) of inal 
value. But if we think of it as having inal value there is a tendency to assume that 
its value must be intrinsic, or “in itself”—value that does not depend on any other 
thing. Contrapositively, if we think a thing’s value does depend on something else—
it has, we may say, extrinsic value—then we think of its value as instrumental. In 
line with this way of thinking one might hear what was said at the beginning of this 
paper and respond: “So the focus of our aesthetic interests, the thing we are attribut-
ing aesthetic value to, is not really the artefact but the agent who made it; it is the 
agent’s qualities that we really care about. That is what is intrinsically valuable; the 
artefact is valuable in so far as it makes those qualities manifest”.
This line of thinking is mistaken. The value a painting has may depend (in part) 
on it bearing the manifestation relation to its maker; to say that is to agree that the 
value the painting has is extrinsic. It is not to say that the painting has value merely 
40 Korsgaard (1983, p. 185).
41 See e.g. Langton (2007) and Dancy (2004), Chapter 9.
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as a means to the identiication of the maker and their qualities. Likewise, one may 
value a wedding ring because of its connection with a wedding, but it does not fol-
low that one values it only instrumentally.42 Nicholas Humphrey, writing about aes-
thetics’ evolutionary past, rightly says that
…we value the work of art only when we see the human hand behind it. We 
marvel at the cave paintings at Lascaux, for example, only because we believe 
they were made by artists. If it were to turn out these images had been created 
by accidental water stains, they’d become merely quaint.43
He also says “We may seem to love beautiful things as if it were indeed the thing of 
beauty in itself that counts for us. But our feeling about the thing is always a proxy 
for our feeling about some idealised person in the background.” This mischaracter-
ises our valuing of beautiful things: we do attribute to them inal value. The fact that 
our valuing depends on their relations to a maker should not tempt us to deny this.
In the light of this there is, we suggest, some continuity between the Acheulean 
and more obviously aesthetic cultures like the Quattrocento, with their hyper-reined 
standards. High aesthetic cultures have not put aside practical interests; aesthetic 
production in ifteenth century Italy was strongly governed by the social ambitions 
of patrons, who controlled the subject, appearance and materials of the work. Aes-
thetic production was not then driven by the need to co-ordinate learners and teach-
ers, since patrons did not generally seek artistic skills. But patrons, then as now, 
were intensely sensitive to the ways in which the pictures that interested them mani-
fested skills of making. As Baxandall says, “[the patron] was aware that the good 
picture embodied skill and he was frequently assured that it was the part of the cul-
tivated beholder to make discriminations about that skill”.44 Baxandall’s focus is 
securely on the picture as site of transaction between maker and viewer, emphasis-
ing the skills necessary properly to discriminate and assess the skills embodied in 
the picture, and how the exercise of these embodied skills contributes to the pleasure 
that pictures aford: “If a painting gives us opportunity for exercising a valued skill 
and rewards our virtuosity with a sense of worthwhile insights into that painting’s 
organisation, we tend to enjoy it”. This suggests a further step, one that Baxandall 
does not explicitly make: to bring within the domain of the aesthetic one’s enjoy-
ment of the skills and sensibilities one brings to the task of appreciating those (dif-
ferent) skills and sensibilities manifested in the work. Kendall Walton, in the process 
of outlining a theory of aesthetic pleasure, is tempted by this idea: “As a irst stab, 
let’s deine aesthetic pleasure as pleasure which has, as a component, pleasure taken 
in one’s admiration or positive evaluation of something”.45 But he draws back from 
this formulation:
42 The example is due to Langton (2007) who at this point ofers an emendation to Korsgaard; we can 
ignore this.
43 Beauty’s child, at http://www.humph rey.org.uk/paper s/2010B eauty ’sChil d.pdf. This otherwise unpub-
lished essay is impressive and deserves to be read more widely.
44 Baxandall (1988, p. 34).
45 Walton (1993, p. 505).
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A person might take pleasure of a self-congratulatory sort in admiring some-
thing; one might pat oneself on the back, with delight, for one’s sophisticated 
and subtle taste in recognizing the thing’s merit. This pleasure would seem not 
to be aesthetic.46
We are unsure why a self-congratulatory pleasure cannot be aesthetic when other-
congratulatory pleasures apparently can be. Calling this pleasure “self-congratula-
tory” suggests that it is indulgent and perhaps self-deceptive. No doubt it can be; it 
might on the other hand be entirely realistic. And an appreciation of a picture’s own 
qualities can be indulgent; you fail to see what is wrong with its sentimentality. It 
may even be self-deceptive, having you assign it qualities which you in some sense 
know it lacks. In such a case we would have a defective aesthetic response, but still 
an aesthetic one. The same applies, we say, for the self-congratulatory case. Without 
claiming that pleasure taken in the exercise of one’s own discriminatory powers is 
essential to any experience that could be called aesthetic, it is surely a frequently 
important part of what motivates us to struggle, as we sometimes do, to understand 
works with qualities which are diicult to discern, and which may require consid-
erable training and experience to reveal.47 We do not, and perhaps cannot, know 
whether Acheulean agents experienced this kind of relexive pleasure—pleasure 
taken in one’s own discernment of the qualities of things. But the outline we have 
given of aesthetic transactions in the Acheulean certainly makes room for this. Pro-
spective apprentices needed to see—to be keen to learn to see—the qualities mani-
fested in the products of skilled makers.48
Where does value come into this? Among aestheticians it’s widely held that aes-
thetic experience is essentially normative; that it is “deinitive of pleasure in beauty 
that it licenses judgments that make claim to correctness”.49 One might suspect that 
Acheulean agents lacked such a normative conception. However, a recent empirical 
study across 19 countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas failed to ind much evi-
dence of this normative stance among contemporary non-aestheticians; in all regions 
the least favoured response (7% of 2392 responses overall) to a situation where one 
inds an object beautiful and the other does not was “One of you is correct while 
the other is not”.50 Level of education, exposure to philosophy, and relective cogni-
tive style were positively correlated with the most popular response (52%): “Neither 
46 Ibid, pp. 505–506, our emphasis; see also his discussion at pp. 507–508.
47 It may also account for what has been called the vice of snobbery in aesthetic appreciation (Kieran 
2010), and hence be a reason why aesthetic appreciation is rather fragile.
48 On much we are in agreement with Walton: “An appreciator’s enjoyable admiration, usually if not 
always, involves not only recognizing a thing’s value—recognizing the marvelous job it does of opening 
our eyes to important truths, for instance, or how wonderfully suited it is for providing safe and eicient 
transportation; one’s admiration also involves recognizing the creator’s accomplishment, the talent and 
skill a person demonstrated by producing something with this value” (Walton 1993, p. 506).
49 James Shelley, Aesthetic Judgment, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https ://plato .stanf ord.edu/
entri es/aesth etic-judgm ent/#Norm.
50 Cova et al. (2019): The highest proportion of objectivist responses was found in South and Southeast 
Asian respondents (22.0%).
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is correct. It makes no sense to talk about correctness in this situation.”51  If these 
results are robust it will be hard to argue that folk-aesthetics is decisively normative. 
On the other hand, it would be interesting to see how answers would be distributed if 
the question speciically concerned disagreement about what skills and abilities are 
evident in the picture, musical passage, or whatever was in question. Our guess is 
that subjects would in this case be drawn towards some form of objectivism in their 
responses. Without supposing that Acheulean agents relected much or at all on this, 
our story of learners and teachers in the Early Stone Age suggests that their behav-
iour would betray a sensitivity to the possibility of being wrong about what skills 
were manifested on a particular occasion; it is important to our story, after all, that 
being right on this subject gave Acheulean agents an advantage in learning.
While more needs to be said on this complex topic we suggest this as a temporary 
stopping place: if there is a core of objectivity in people’s pre-theoretical approach 
to aesthetic objectivity, it is to be found in the ways we judge aesthetic success in 
terms of the efective deployment of skills.
In this section we compared the Acheulean not merely to an aesthetic culture but 
to one which is paradigmatically artistic: the Quattrocento. That was an artistic cul-
ture within which aesthetic values were deeply embedded, but the two conditions 
are separable; the rise of anti-aesthetic art in our own time shows that in one direc-
tion, and it has always been recognised that many artefacts that give aesthetic pleas-
ure—well-designed computers, Korsgaard’s “gorgeously enameled frying pans”—
do not count as art.52 The relations between art and the aesthetic are complex and 
contested: we are not claiming that the Acheulean was an artistic culture, and we do 
not know how one would go about deciding whether it was.
6  Evolutionary speculations53
The Acheulean occupied perhaps a million and a half years of hominin evolution. 
How does our story of the emergence of aesthetic sensibility connect with the mech-
anisms of evolution? These days we have a rich menu of explanatory options, from 
the postulation of a genetically determined instinct at one end, through theories that 
propose mechanisms of gene-culture interaction, to the cultural constructivism of 
Heyes, for whom such distinctively human adaptations as imitation, mentalizing and 
language (hereafter “the triad”) arose and stabilised in the culturally determined way 
that is generally agreed for reading/writing.54 Along with most others we reject the 
genetic determinism option. It is harder to be conident as between remaining alter-
natives, and in this section our aims are very modest; we do no more than (a) clarify 
51 Cova et al. (2019): A third response “Both of you are correct” was favoured by 41%.
52 Korsgaard (1983, p. 185). For the aesthetics of non-art objects and the tendency to see art objects as 
central cases of the aesthetic, see Saito (2007, pp. 13–18).
53 We are grateful to the editors of this special issue for comments which led to substantial changes in 
this section.
54 See Heyes (2018, pp. 148–151).
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how the debate between alternatives is best understood by someone interested in the 
question immediately above; (b) point to a domain of inquiry where relevant evi-
dence may be found; (c) emphasise the weakness of the currently available evidence.
After genetic determinism, next along the shelf of options is appeal to some form 
of gene-culture interaction, with genetic assimilation a currently popular version. 
Genetic assimilation—a relation of the Baldwin efect—is appealed to by Dor, Gins-
berg and Jablonka in discussing an aspect of Acheulean culture:
Genetic assimilation… occurs when a developmentally-induced or learned 
response becomes less dependent on environmental induction or on learning. 
For example, if a million years ago, during the teaching of Acheulean tool-
making, more eicient imitation-learning was beneicial, selection for better 
imitators could lead to the genetic assimilation of genes that facilitate vocal 
and motor imitation.55
Their suggestion is that the complex demands of Acheulean tool making required 
imitation-learning, and so favoured a degree of genetic control “that allowed indi-
viduals to put less efort into their learning, as long as it did not jeopardize too much 
other learning capacities” (519). We have argued that the complexity of Acheulean 
tools made imitation on its own an inefective means of skill-transfer.56 Acquiring 
expertise in this area required a suite of capacities, including imitation but also the 
ability to discriminate between more and less skilful productions in others. The 
thought then naturally occurs that this too was subject to genetic assimilation.
This line of argument is rejected by Heyes, who claims that even those capaci-
ties most likely to be seen as under at least partly genetic control—including our 
triad—are in fact the product of cultural change, just as reading and writing are gen-
erally thought to be. Heyes’ leading argument (she has others) is that “distinctively 
human cognitive mechanisms are tracking targets that move too fast for genetic evo-
lution”.57 To us, this suggests a too high-level speciication of the cognitive mecha-
nisms in question. As Roige and Carruthers (2019) put it “Although what one needs 
to learn from one’s culture is continually shifting, copying the prestigious remains 
a good strategy; although the actions that need to be imitated change, a system that 
fast-maps vision and audition to action remains useful”.58 But we can’t here adju-
dicate this complex issue with its many strands of argument; instead we take a step 
back and note this dialectical point: it is generally agreed that reading/writing is a 
purely cultural phenomenon, so one way to think about the evolution of skills-based 
aesthetic sensibility is to decide whether it is substantially similar to reading/writ-
ing and substantially dissimilar from the triad. If it is, there is a prima facie case 
for seeing that sensibility as wholly cultural; if that sensibility looks signiicantly 
like capacities in the triad and unlike reading/writing progress will then depend on a 
55 Dor et  al. (2019, p. 524). They go on to note that “genetic assimilation is almost always partial, 
leading to quicker and more eicient context-sensitive responses rather than to stimulus-independent 
‘instincts” (p. 525). David Papineau uses the term “genetic takeover”; see his (2005) excellent The Cul-
tural Origins of Cognitive Adaptations.
56 See above, text to notes 28 and 29.
57 Heyes (2018, p. 208).
58 Roige and Carruthers (2019, p. 541).
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decision about whether, despite appearances, capacities in the triad are really of the 
same kind as reading/writing.59
This is another dispute we cannot settle here. A useful irst step might be to ask 
whether skills-based appreciation shows a developmental trajectory that is quick and 
reliable, something generally regarded as distinctive of capacities in the triad. As far 
as we can see, the question has never been raised in the developmental literature and 
even indirect evidence is thin on the ground. An obvious place to look is studies of 
children’s responses to art and we will note one study of this kind. Nissel, Hawley-
Dolan & Winner examined the responses of children to abstract pictures made by 
two groups: irstly, famous artists such as Hofmann, Frankenthaler and Rothko, and 
secondly, children and animals. They presented 4–7- and 8–10-year olds with paired 
images, and asked which the children preferred and which was better.60 An earlier 
study (Hawley-Dolan and Winner 2011) presented pictures by artists paired with 
pictures by children or animals to adults with no background in art; they were asked 
which they liked more and which were of better quality. Some pairs were unlabelled 
while others had either true or reversed labels (artist and child, monkey, elephant). 
In all cases, adults preferred and judged as better the works by the artists. Inter-
estingly, their justiications for claims of quality signiicantly involved reference to 
abilities, citing for example a degree of intentionality and successful planning.61
The children in the 2014 experiment showed a much less consistent pattern for 
true and reversed labelling; focusing only on the unlabelled condition, for younger 
children, 40% of preferred pictures were by artists, while 45% of those picked for 
quality were by artists; the comparable result for older children was 40% and 53% 
while for adults it was 59% and 72%. Nissel et  al. conclude that “it appears as if 
[concerning judgements of quality] the 8- to 10-year-olds’ responses are on a tra-
jectory in between those of the 4- to 7-year-olds and the adults” (p. 24). But this 
trajectory looks slow, with the oldest children (10 years) still judging work by artists 
to be of better quality only about half the time; little obvious reason to postulate a 
biological force at work additional to enculturation.62 Also, the details of the study 
do not indicate to what extent children’s judgements of quality were inluenced by 
considerations of skill; no one doubts, we hope, that the ones by artists were in fact 
the more skilfully executed, but we would be presuming the truth of our own thesis 
if we concluded that judgements of aesthetic quality, as revealed by these experi-
ments, were driven by sensitivity to skill.63
59 Even Heyes (2019, p. 557) grants that appearances are against the “same kind” hypothesis: “Even 
when one studies the evidence of late development and everyday instruction, the intuition remains (I still 
have it) that, while learning to read print is a laborious business, learning to imitate, talk and read minds 
is like falling of a log.”.
60 Nissel et al. (2016).
61 Hawley-Dolan and Winner (2011).
62 The 10-year old group was small (8) and the proportion of their choices of artist-works as showing 
better quality (48%) was below that for two year groups immediately below. Here are the proportions for 
that same judgement by year group from age 4 to age 10: 4:35%, 5:44%, 6:46%, 7:50%, 8:55%, 9:53%, 
10:48%. Even if the igure for the 10-year old group is an underestimation progress looks slow.
63 Though children “sometimes justiied their choices [in favour of a picture by a child or animal] by 
crediting the efort the child or animal had made (e.g., ‘it’s really good for an elephant’)” (p. 18, see also 
p. 26).
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At this stage we believe that very little can be said with conidence about the 
mechanisms that replicate a skills-based aesthetic sensitivity across the generations.
7  Conclusion
We have suggested that there are very ancient signs of what is also a very mod-
ern sensibility: delight in the appearances of artefacts which display, through their 
appearances, the personal qualities that contributed to their having those very 
appearances. Drawing on recent archaeological work we ofered an account of the 
inluence on this process of what we might call the lithic niche: those alterations to 
the environment of Acheulean agents caused by their use of stone tools—alterations 
which radically reshaped social relations and created a need for the transmission of 
complex skills. We argued that this gives us grounds for thinking that the Acheulean 
was an aesthetic culture, though not, for all we know, an artistic one.
Funding Funding for Xuanqi Zhu was provided by China Scholarship Council (Grant No. 
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